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1 
The Primacy of Political Security: Contentious Politics and Insecurity in the Tunisian 
Revolution 
 
7KHUHPRYDORI%HQ$OL¶VUHJLPHLQ7XQLVLDVLJQDOOHGWKHVWDUWRIWKH$UDE6SULQJ7KHDEUXSW
nature of the regime change raises questions about why it happened in the way it did. This 
article examines the contextual factors that precipitated the regime change through the lens of 
political security. The aim is to examine how political insecurity in society led to the 
emergence of opposition sufficiently organised to unseat Ben Ali. The paper develops a 
framework to consider how the loss of legitimacy by the regime opened the space for 
opposition. Attempts to restrict opposition failed to address underlying claims, leaving the 
way open for the opposition to unite following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi. 
 
Keywords: political security, legitimacy, protest, state capacity, Tunisia 
 
Introduction 
 The flight of Ben Ali from Tunisia in January 2011 following days of protest provides 
a compelling case regarding the importance of political security. Although the events 
following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi caught international attention, the 
level of discontent had been growing for some time. When opposition emerged it was shaped 
and channelled by the degree of control that the regime had been able to exert over society. 
Examining the unintended consequences of this control, MacQueen argues that: 
the ability of the Ben Ali regime to destroy, divide and co-opt opposition saw its final 
challenge emerge as a disaggregated movement, one impossible to quell as there was no clear 
target.1 
The unpredictability of the opposition therefore resulted in a failure of the regime's control 
mechanisms and demonstrated the inherent fragility of the ruling institutions. Understanding 
and assessing the sources of this apparent fragility and the way in which opposition coalesced 
is a necessary task in understanding the course of events. 
 The protests that led to the ouster of the regime had their roots in deep economic 
inequalities within society and geographically between different parts of the country.2 In the 
context of a closed political system, opportunities to express discontent and claims against 
the regime were limited. The study of contentious politics suggests that changes in political 
opportunity structures provide a means to identify decisions of actors to initiate change.3 
Events leading to the fall of the Ben Ali regime do not immediately suggest a significant 
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change in the political opportunities available to opponents. Therefore, in order to understand 
the fragility of the regime's control it is important to examine the origins of the disaggregated 
movement that did emerge. The notion of political security provides a frame within which to 
consider the operation of the regime and also the rise of an opposition sufficient to challenge 
it. 
 This article considers the roots of the opposition movement that led to the 2011 
regime change in Tunisia. The aim is to examine how political insecurity in society 
precipitated the eventual outcome. The analysis will inform an understanding of the 
significance of protest as an expression of perceived insecurity within the population. The 
remainder of the article is divided into three sections. The first section examines the social, 
economic and political patterns that existed in Tunisia before the 2011 revolution. This is 
significant given the disjunction between the regime's focus on economic performance to 
legitimise its rule and the growing economic inequalities that underpinned the protests. The 
second section focuses on the wave of protest that led up to the fall of the regime to illustrate 
the way in which political insecurity facilitated the emergence of the disaggregated, but 
extensive opposition movement. The final section draws on concepts linked to civil society, 
contentious politics and democratisation to assess the way in which opposition emerged and 
reasons for its dramatic impact.  
 
Tunisia Under Ben Ali (1987-2011) 
 Tunisia under Ben Ali exhibited a number of contradictory tendencies, but one 
constant was the non-democratic character of the regime. Despite a limited opening following 
the seizure of power in 1987, the regime maintained a tight control on expressions of dissent. 
In order to retain the quiescence over the longer-term, the regime relied on an extensive 
internal security network that dealt harshly with any opposition5HIOHFWLQJRQ%HQ$OL¶VILUVW
decade, Murphy argued: 
arbitrary detentions, mass trials and allegations of torture quickly began to tarnish the 
UHJLPH¶VLPDJHDWKRPHDQGDEURDG2QFHXQOHDVKHGWKHVHFXULW\EHDVWSURYHGLPSRVVLEOHWR
GULYHEDFNLQWRWKHFDJH« [and] increasingly turned on the secular opposition4 
This was in keeping with the practice of the previous regime and was effective in maintaining 
control . The regime sought to demonstrate its credentials through a form of performance 
legitimacy5, based on two key pillars: limiting the Islamist threat and maintaining economic 
growth. These tendencies were reflected in the cycle of elections under Ben Ali that 
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emphasised the success in neutralising the Islamist threat (1994 and 1999 elections), before 
shifting to economic development and prosperity in 2004 and 2009.6 
 Dealing with the perceived Islamist threat generated support for the policies of the 
regime, which was tempered over time as repression spread to other oppositional actors.7 The 
regime prevented the Islamist Ennahda party from taking part in the 1989 parliamentary 
elections, but members of the party were able to stand as independent candidates. Allani 
argues that, although the Ennahda had moderated its language in the run-up to the election, its 
FDPSDLJQµSXWIRUZDUGVRPHH[WUHPLVWSURSRVDOVGHQRXQFLQJZRPHQ¶VULJKWVDQGH[SORLWLQJ
UHOLJLRQLQSXEOLFOLIH«>UHVXOWLQJLQ@KRVWLOLW\LQSXEOLFRSLQLRQDQGIURPWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶8 
This more radical position provided an opening for the regime to portray the Islamist 
opposition as a threat and exclude it. In response, the party turned to more extreme measures, 
with radical offshoots such as the Salafist Jihadists emerging and engaging in conflict with 
the state.9 The result was that the public turned increasingly against the broader Islamist 
opposition movement, alienating it from its potential support base.10 The claims of the regime 
about the Islamist opposition were substantiated by violent confrontations, with a clash 
between government forces and Salafist Jihadists in early 2007.11 Therefore, despite the 
genuine early challenge presented by Ennhada,12 the radicalisation of parts of the movement 
allowed the regime to portray it as a threat and justify the use of force. 
 $V WKH VHFRQG SLOODU RI WKH UHJLPH¶V OHJLWLPDF\ HFRQRPLF SHUIRUPDQFH SUHVHQWV D
complicated picture. In terms of general economic performance, GDP per capita almost 
doubled between 1987 and 2010 from 1603.81 to 3143.53 (US$ 2000 constant).13 This trend 
continued and accelerated growth seen under the previous regime, income climbed steadily as 
the population also grew. In order to achieve this growth, the regime adhered rigidly to the 
guidelines set down by the IMF and other international actors, leading to privatisation and 
PDUNHWL]DWLRQ RI WKH HFRQRPLF VSKHUH 7R DFKLHYH D VWDEOH HFRQRPLF V\VWHP µWKH UHJLPH
sought to transfer the burden of export-income generation to the private sector in a manner 
WKDWLVVXVWDLQDEOHDQGEDVHGRQGLYHUVHLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\FRPSHWLWLYHSURGXFWLRQ¶14 Tsourapas 
argues the nature of the reform programme allowed the regime to maintain control over the 
social configuration of work, specifically ZKHQ µSURPRWLQJD VSHFLILFZRUNHWKLF WKDW RI D
well-EHKDYHG 7XQLVLDQ WKH UHJLPH IRXQG D QDWXUDO DOO\ LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V EXVLQHVV VHFWRU¶15 
'HVSLWHWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIHFRQRPLFVWDELOLW\-RKQVWRQDUJXHVWKHUHJLPHµH[LVWHGSULPDULO\WR
enrich and protect the President, his family, and politically connected elites....top-down 
exploitation extended, by various connections, all the way down to the neighbourhood and 
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YLOODJH OHYHO¶16 The extent of corruption ensured that the benefits of improved economic 
performance were not felt by the population. 
 Turning to the actual effects and distribution of the economic benefits of growth 
reveals a source of insecurity for the population and ultimately the regime. Rates of 
unemployment by level of education (Figure 1) demonstrate a shift during the time Ben Ali 
was in power. Rates of unemployment for those with primary or no formal education fell 
during the period, while those with secondary and higher education saw an increase. Of 
particular significance is the increase in unemployed graduates from a rate of 1.6 percent in 
1994 to 28 percent in 2010. This is a substantial increase in a group with aspirations and 
expectations, which were not borne out by the quality of the qualifications they received, 
providing a source of discontent amongst a growing section of the population.17 The rates of 
unemployment also varied significantly by region, with the North and Central East regions 
(including the capital Tunis) having an official unemployment rate in 2007 of 11.97 percent, 
whereas the interior regions saw a rate of 17.88 percent.18 This difference demonstrates a 
significant variation in the relative economic opportunities in different parts of the country.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 Given these tensions, a question could be raised about why the regime did not fall 
until 2011. Part of the reason for this can be found in the way in which it dealt with 
dissenting views. Murphy identifies this as an outgrowth of the response to the Islamist 
threat: 
Having successfully eradicated their challenge ...[Ben Ali] turned upon the secular and legal 
opposition, containing any genuine pluralism through the application of a rigorous security 
UHJLPH« >UHVXOWLQJ LQ@ D K\EULG UHJLPH H[KLELWLQJ GHPRFUDWLF SURFHGXUDO SUDFWLFHV EXW
authoritarian patterns of power holding.19 
Civil society organisations in Tunisia were restricted and limited in their ability to operate, 
yet there were some key organisations that exercised some degree of influence. These 
included the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) and the Tunisian League for Defence 
of Human Rights (LTDH) founded in 1946 and 1976 respectively.20 Both organisations were 
subject to interference by the regime, but found ways of managing these pressures. Although 
the UGTT was weakened by the success of the regime in manipulating the leadership and the 
SHUFHSWLRQWKDWLWLVµDUHOLFRIWKHSDVWUDWKHUWKDQDIRUFHIRUWKHIXWXUH¶21 it continued to play 
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a role in labour disputes. The LTDH was more successful in fighting off state co-optation, but 
µattempts to reassert its LQGHSHQGHQW YRLFH KDYH FRVW LW GHDUO\« >DV WKH VWDWH@ PRYHG IURP
legalistic measures to active JRYHUQPHQWDO DQG SROLFH KDUDVVPHQW¶22 The control exercised 
over these peak organisations illustrates the limits of political freedom under the Ben Ali 
regime and the use of institutionalised control measures to restrict dissenting voices. 
 In addition to the UGTT and the LTDH, other professional organisations existed that 
represented the rights of their members in the face of challenges by the regime. One of the 
more significant was the Bar Council, which staged strikes, sit-ins and engaged in protest 
demonstrations over issues such as persecution of journalists and attempts to limit the 
independence of the courts and extend regime control.23 Given the centrality of the legal 
profession, these protests were successful in generating some limited concessions from the 
regime and holding back attempts at bringing them under control, leading Gobe to argue that 
WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ PRYHG µIURP >DQ@ LQVWUXPHQW RI 6WDWH FRQWURl to a social space for the 
FU\VWDOOLVDWLRQRISURIHVVLRQDODQGSROLWLFDORSSRVLWLRQ¶24 Alongside these key groups, other 
more spontaneous groupings have emerged. Of particular significance, in view of the trend in 
unemployment figures noted above, was the formation in 2007 of the Union of Unemployed 
Graduates. This group formed to protest over the lack of jobs and opportunities available for 
the growing number of graduates. While it was tolerated initially by the regime, its 
emergence during a period of decreasing political freedoms led to a crackdown.25 The 
emergence of this group was significant as it formed in the relatively impoverished central 
regions of the country, bringing together issues of regional unemployment and poverty.  
These groups all presented a challenge to the authority of the regime, leading to 
attempts to control their activities. The experience of the UGTT, LTDH, Bar Council and the 
journalists union show that the preferred option was to attempt to co-opt the leadership rather 
than directly attack the organisations. The experience of the Union of Unemployed Graduates 
shows that, where it was deemed necessary, the regime was willing to use force. Although 
these groups challenged the state in various ways, they had limited impact on the practices of 
the regime. This can be linked to the level of control exercised by the regime through its 
internal security structures and the resulting inability to mobilise groups to work together to 
form a cohesive opposition movement. Where opposition did emerge it was centred in 
economically and geographically peripheral parts of the country allowing the state to limit the 
likelihood of such opposition spreading. 
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The durability of the regime was also facilitated by the security context in the wider 
region. Following the attacks on the US in 2001 there was heightened concern around the 
SRWHQWLDOWKUHDWSRVHGE\,VODPLFJURXSV%HQ$OL¶VUHJLPHKDGEHHQDFRQVLVWHQWRSSRQHQWRI
VXFKJURXSVGRPHVWLFDOO\ZKLFKSURYLGHGLWDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRµSOD\RQWKHVHFXULWy concerns 
RI:HVWHUQGHPRFUDFLHV WRUHWDLQWKHLUVXSSRUW¶26 Landolt and Kubicek argue that although 
the Western states had less influence over the MENA states than those in the former soviet 
VSDFH 7XQLVLD¶V µVPDOOHU HFRQRP\ DQG IHZHU FRPSHWLQJ VHFXULW\ LVVXHV¶ PHDQW WKDW LW ZDV
possible to exert influence over its domestic practices.27 While US and the EU attempted to 
influence the regime through efforts at democracy promotion this was secondary to their 
desire to maintain stability in the region, tending towards the status quo.28 Together these 
factors combined to support the longer-term stability of the Ben Ali regime and shaped the 
nature of the opposition that did emerge as considered in the next section.  
 
Protest and Repression in the Origins of the Tunisian Revolution 
 The control the regime exercised over formal organisations also extended to 
demonstrations against the policies of the regime. Instead of resorting to open repression, the 
regime made use of internal security and other apparatus to limit expressions of dissent. 
Where open opposition did emerge in the form of protest actions, the regime attempted to co-
opt sections of the opposition, and resorted to force if this was not successful. An 
examination of the number of social conflict events over the 1991-2010 period (Figure 2) 
provides an indication of the limited scope of protest actions.29 Although this data focuses 
primarily on newspaper reports of protest events, it has been noted that the use of this form of 
data can provide a means of measuring relative change in basic levels of protest actions. As 
Rootes argues with regard to environmental protests:  
We cannot hope, even by the most sophisticated analysis of data derived from media reports, 
closely to approach an unmediated record of events, but we can reasonably hope to give as 
comprehensive and balanced account of events as it is possible to assemble from public 
sources.30 
The following section utilises this data to assess change in the scale of the protest events over 
the period, in relation to changes in the actions of the character of the regime. 
 
Figure 2 
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 The level of recorded social conflict remained relatively low for much of the 1990s, 
with few events taking place and of limited intensity (as measured by number of days of 
duration). From 2000, the number of recorded events began to increase, with events in that 
year being relatively short in duration (six events over seven days). There was a further 
change in 2005 when there was a significant increase in the intensity, with the four recorded 
events lasting a total of 40 days. This shift is significant as it suggests that the degree of 
commitment was increasing among those engaged in social conflict and challenging the state. 
The level of protest in 2008 is drawn primarily from Gobe (2009) and focused on a more 
specific region, however it points to the emergence of a cycle of contention.31 During this 
period, 19 distinct events were recorded lasting a total of 112 days, centred on the Gafsa 
region.32 What started as a protest against unemployment and a march by unemployed 
graduates, students, union members and mothers of injured workers to the Gafsa Phosphate 
Company on 5th of January grew into a more intense and sustained period of protest.33 The 
protest wave was brought to an end by force by the regime and the deployment of the army 
on 7th of June.34 Following these events, the level of protest remained relatively low until the 
beginning of the protest cycle in late 2010 that resulted in the removal of Ben Ali. 
 While these data rely primarily on newspaper sources and are partial they demonstrate 
some important features of opposition. Actions against the regime remained at relatively low 
level with occasional spikes in activity. The duration was also short, as the regime was able 
to bring them to an end through the use of inducements or force. This low level and intensity 
of protest when combined with the inability of organised groups (such as the LTDH and 
UGTT) to challenge the regime directly points to the degree of control. Addressing this point, 
Perkins argues: 
few civil society organizations had the ability to function at all effectively beyond the limited 
parameters permitted by the authorities, and only the largest, best organized and most 
entrenched such as the UGTT had any real possibility of challenging the practices of the 
regime, and they only with considerable discretion and circumspection.35 
The focus of the protests on economic conditions demonstrates the way in which political 
insecurity limited opportunities to seek remedies for other forms of insecurity.36 
The reaction of the regime to this perceived threat to its authority can be demonstrated 
by considering changes in political rights. Figure 3 shows the Freedom House scores for the 
Tunisian regime from 1986-2013.37 During the early period of the Ben Ali regime there was a 
loosening of civil liberties and political rights as he sought to consolidate his position and 
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eliminate potential opponents (such as Ennhada). This was reversed in 1992 when civil 
liberties and political rights were restricted and control was re-asserted.38 The second point of 
note is that, in 2007, the regime further restricted the political rights of the population in a 
time of heightening tensions. This may be seen as a reaction to the (limited) increase in the 
level and intensity of social conflict targeting the state. If this was the case, the restriction of 
political rights rather than civil liberties would accord with the tendency of the regime to 
avoid open confrontation in favour of co-opting opponents and restricting the political space. 
In so doing, the regime gave the appearance of allowing some opposition mobilisation, as 
long as it did not create instability. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 The data support the earlier assertion that the regime was able to maintain limits on 
the expression of dissent through control of the social and political spheres. The pattern of 
institutional roles and power within the regime meant that the legislative branch was weak, 
with little ability to challenge the executive.39 Coupled with the pervasive internal security 
forces, the lack of political rights and representation meant that the populace was at the 
mercy of the regime. In such an environment, the protests and opposition to the regime 
expressed by groups such as the LTDH and Bar Council were unable to lead to the formation 
of coordinated and sustained action. Hibou argues that this allowed the control of the regime 
to go beyond physical domination through repression: 
LISROLFLQJ>LQ7XQLVLD@KDVDQXQTXHVWLRQDEOHLQIOXHQFHRQSHRSOH¶s frame of mind, perhaps 
even more than the organisation of daily life, control takes place, above all, through constant 
coercive practices involving economic and social activities.40 
The centralisation of power in the executive, and in particular the president, made any 
concerted opposition force of limited use.41  
The use of measures to contain dissent coupled with the failure of the regime to 
address the underlying concerns of the population undermined its claim to legitimacy and 
precipitated its downfall. The marginalisation of the central and southern regions at the 
expense of the northern and coastal regions led to inequalities that generated a sense of 
injustice. When this injustice was expressed through contentious actions, the state security 
forces responded with repressive tactics. In the normal run of events the use of force coupled 
with limited economic inducements was sufficient to deal with opposition. However, the 
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steady accumulation of economic inequalities coupled with the use of repressive force meant 
that the costs of not acting had accumulated to a point where action against the regime was 
conceivable.42 The actions of Mohamed Bouazizi acted as a trigger that precipitated the 
emergence of diverse opposition pursuing different aims. Ayeb argues: 
While the marginalised classes protested with demands for employment, food and an end to 
marginalisation and exclusion, the middle classes fought tooth and nail for individual 
liberties, for political rights of expression, organisation and participation, for the 
consolidation or affirmation of their new rights, especially for women, and for an 
improvement in incomes and standards of living.43 
In the absence of outlets to express this sense of frustration, the resulting protests were 
diffuse and varied, making it more difficult for the state to maintain order.44  
The final failure of the regime was represented in the unwillingness of the armed 
forces to use force against the opposition protests.45 As noted above, the regime possessed a 
formidable internal security force that was able to maintain order. However, the reliance on 
informal mechanisms and structures to maintain order undermined and weakened its ability 
to rely on the institutions of the state. As a professional body the military was unwilling to 
obey the order to repress the protests to protect the regime. Similar outcomes have been 
observed in other situations, as the loss of legitimacy and authority by the non-democratic 
regime requires actors to assess the relative costs of actions against the population.46 The 
unwillingness of the military to obey the order to use force against the population arose due 
WR WKHµLQFUHDVLQJO\SHUVRQDOLVWDQGFRUUXSWUHJLPH>WKDW@PD\KDYHEHHQDJURZLQJOLDELOLW\
for the military, subverting its core organizational inWHUHVWV¶47 
Loss of legitimacy by the regime saw increasing opposition within society. Although 
the level of action against the regime remained relatively low and disconnected for much of 
the period, the claims that were being made centred on common concerns. Attempts by the 
regime to close down opportunities for expression of discontent, as represented by a decrease 
in political rights from 2007, were not sufficient to quell opposition. When Mohammed 
Bouazizi set himself alight he provided a symbolic figure that crystallised the diverse 
opposition and provided a rallying point that demonstrated the level of discontent and 
absence of regime legitimacy.48 This was a significant moment, as it provided the impetus for 
diverse opposition actors to coalesce and overcome the constraints imposed by the state. The 
unwillingness of the armed forces to intervene to protect the regime further demonstrated this 
loss of control. The regime had extensive repressive apparatus at its disposal, but the 
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systematic weakening of key institutions meant that it was unable to rely on these when 
needed. 
 
Protest, Political Insecurity and Democratisation 
 The spectre of political insecurity hung over the Ben Ali regime and ultimately sowed 
the seeds that led to his downfall. Political security in this sense refers to the degree of 
certainty about how the regime will act in particular situations, allowing participants to make 
decisions and judgements with confidence over the likely outcome. The pervasive network of 
corruption that underpinned the regime limited opportunities for advancement and certainty, 
as arbitrary decisions governed the actions of state representatives.49 This section draws on 
the case to ask how political insecurity can interact with civil society and contentious politics 
to initiate regime change. The analysis will also take into consideration the way in which 
democratisation (or opportunity for) may be fostered by such interactions.  
 Political insecurity was important in undermining the regime in two key areas: state 
capacity and individual perceptions. State capacity refers to the ability of the governing 
regime to maintain order and provide for its citizens. The underlying principle is one of 
FRQWUROOHDGLQJ6HZHOOWRDUJXHWKDWµ7REHIXOO\HIIHFWLYHWKHVWDWH¶VSolicing must cover the 
HQWLUH VSDFH RI LWV WHUULWRU\¶50 Delving into the specifics of state capacity Cummings and 
Nørgaard have identified four dimensions: ideational, political, technical and 
implementational.51 The ideational dimension denotes the degree to which the state is seen as 
legitimate, while the political dimension captures the ability of the state to function 
effectively when dealing with stakeholders. These two dimensions form the core of state 
capacity and are mutually reinforcing; in the absence of either the state will struggle to 
function effectively. Technical and implementational dimensions follow, identifying the 
intellectual and organisational resources of the state and the ability to implement decisions. 
This view of state capacity assumes a balance between dimensions, for example, if the state 
lacks ideational capacity it may be forced to rely on coercive measures to fulfil its aims. 
 Individual perceptions of political security are significant as they capture the view 
from below. These are represented at an aggregate level in the notion of ideational capacity, 
as the state is seen as legitimate to the extent to which it provides for the needs of the 
population. The form of political system determines how the state is able to generate 
legitimacy and in turn guarantee perceptions of security. In non-democratic systems the 
legitimacy of the state is reliant on economic performance or protection of national identity 
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from external threats.52 In such a context views from society can be discounted or suppressed 
if they threaten the dominant position of the regime elites. In addition, Davenport argues that 
µthere are generally no effecWLYHPHFKDQLVPVIRUFRXQWHULQJ³FKHFNLQJ´ WKHFRHUFLYHSRZHU
RI DXWKRULW\ ZLWKLQ VXFK JRYHUQPHQWV¶53 By contrast, Bunce and Wolchik argue that 
µGHPRFUDFLHVDUHPRUHUHVSHFWIXORIKXPDQULJKWV WKH\DUHOHVVOLNHO\WRPDNHFDWDVWURSKLF
PLVWDNHVDQGWKH\KDYHDVWURQJHUUHFRUGWKDQGLFWDWRUVKLSVZLWKUHVSHFWWR«PDWHULDOTXDOLW\
RI OLIH¶54 Although claims made by individuals and groups may not lead to change, the 
presence of feedback mechanisms allowing expression of discontent generate legitimacy, as 
participants accept the process.55 
 Civil society provides the space for opposition groups to gather and articulate claims 
in relation to the state. Outlining the character of civil society, Linz and Stepan define it as: 
an arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively 
independent from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities 
and advance their interests.56 
In this vein, civil society is represented as a relatively independent sphere, subject to 
oversight and management by the state. The essence of civil society is that it possesses the 
means to encourage change, whereas the character of economic and political systems is based 
on institutional structures and a degree of certainty, preventing the emergence of greater 
dynamism. Although civil society can represent dynamism, Chandhoke notes that it is not 
SRVVLEOH WR µDVVXPH FLYLO VRFLHW\ LV HPDQFLSDWHG RU DEVWUDFWHG IURP WKH HWKRV WKDW
permeates¶57 The political and economic spheres. The strength and form of civil society is 
heavily influenced by the context. 
The constraints imposed by the non-democratic system in excluding and 
marginalising dissenting voices shapes the way in which opposition emerges. Where political 
expression is restricted, associational activity declines as individuals become isolated, 
privatised and demoralised, undermining the development of a broader active civil society.58 
Although non-democratic regimes can constrain opposition, the issue of capacity and the 
(in)ability to provide for the needs of the population may create further challenges. Berman 
identifies the risks associated with civil society in the absence of effective capacity 
µLI«SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG VWUXFWXUHV DUH ZHDN DQGRU WKH H[LVWLQJ SROLWLFDO UHJLPH LV
perceived to be ineffectual and illegitimate, then civil society activity may become an 
alternative to politics¶59 Civil society therefore becomes an alternative zone as the population 
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turns to practices of self-help, further challenging the legitimacy of the state. This tendency 
will be reinforced in what North et al refer to as natural states where  
A hierarchy of elite relationships exists in which small groups of powerful elite individuals 
know one another through direct personal contact and experience. These circles of elite 
relationships interlock: all elite individuals know and are associated with other elite 
individuals above and below them in the social hierarchy.60 
The regime in Tunisia operated along these lines, with access to resources and opportunities 
determined by proximity to the ruling family.61 
Contentious politics provides tools with which to interpret and understand 
manifestations of discontent that arise within civil society in response to perceived injustices. 
Defining contentious politics, Charles Tilly argued that it: 
LQYROYHV LQWHUDFWLRQV LQ ZKLFK DFWRUV PDNH FODLPV EHDULQJ RQ VRPHRQH HOVH¶V LQterests, in 
which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Contentious 
politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, 
and politics.62 
This illustrates the broad scope of activities captured by the concept, with actions ranging 
from meetings and demonstrations through to civil wars and revolutions. By placing actions 
in a spectrum, it also points to a unity among forms, recognising the centrality of contention 
and colleFWLYHDFWLRQ5HILQLQJ WKHFRQFHSW6HZHOODUJXHV WKDW LW µPLJKWDOVREHGHILQHGDV
concerted social action that has the goal of overcoming deep rooted structural 
GLVDGYDQWDJH¶63 This was certainly on display in Tunisia with key protests taking place in 
economically disadvantaged regions before spreading to the core. 
 The state plays a central role in contentious politics, serving as both target of the 
majority of claims and as provider of the space in which contention takes place. As noted 
above, expectations and limitations of civil society activities are defined by the state through 
the structuring of the legal and political environment.64 Within this context, the state 
determines WKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGWKUHDWV WKDWDFWRUVIDFHE\µFKRRVLQJDPL[RIFRQFHVVions 
DQG UHSUHVVLRQ¶65 when responding to claims. In establishing these limits the state divides 
claim-making performances into prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden actions, with the 
boundaries between each determined and conveyed to those involved.66 Forms of contentious 
politics vary significantly between cases, as they are shaped by the context in which they 
HPHUJH7DUURZDUJXHVWKDWWKHµUHSHUWRLUHRIFRQWHQWLRQRIIHUVPRYHPHQWVWKUHHEURDGW\SHV
of collective action ± disruption, violence and contained EHKDYLRXU¶67 The adoption of 
disruptive actions is the most common (and effective) approach, as it seeks to challenge and 
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break with established practices, and highlight perceived injustices. Central to disruptive 
DFWLRQVLVLQQRYDWLYHEHKDYLRXUZKLFKµLQForporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes 
collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or 
IRUELGGHQZLWKLQWKHUHJLPHLQTXHVWLRQ¶68  
 When considering contentious performances in this context, it is important to 
determine what factors provide the impetus for mobilization. Actors exist within a wider 
external environment that in turn shapes their decisions by presenting both opportunities and 
threats. These external opportunities have been divided into five specific categories ± 
openness of the regime, coherence of the elite, stability of political alignments, availability of 
allies, and repression/facilitation ± together with shifts in the rate of change that determine 
the political opportunity structure.69 A change in any of these categories can increase or 
decrease the costs involved in action, thereby feeding into decision-making processes. The 
relationship between the political opportunity structure and action is not uniform and 
deterministic, but rather relative and contextual. Goldstone and Tilly note that where the costs 
of not acting outweigh the potential risks of acting, contentious action is possible.70 Rather 
than facing repression or ongoing insecurity a group may act against the state to pre-empt 
perceived threats or at least limit the costs involved. Examining the costs of repression, 
Francisco notes that the use of disproportionate repression by the state can also lead to a 
backlash and the emergence of new forms of contention.71 Such reactions point to a view that 
the actions of the state are illegitimate, providing opportunities for organised collective 
resistance to emerge. 
If the state lacks the capacity to maintain order and satisfy the demands of its 
population (or if there is a perception that this is the case), groups engaged in contentious 
politics can turn to violent means. Considering the factors that lead to the escalation of 
conflict, Saxton and Benson identify social mobilisation, repression, external rebellion, and 
regime change all of which are possible in times of political uncertainty, when limits are ill-
defined.72 $NEDED DQG 7D\GDV IXUWKHU QRWH WKDW µ>S@URWHVW«LV DERXW QHJRWLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH
SROLWLFDOPHDQVSURYLGHGE\WKHVWDWH¶73 Therefore, where the state lacks the will or capacity 
to negotiate, more direct forms of action (including the use of violence) may be adopted by 
claim-making groups. This is reflected in the finding that where the state uses repressive 
means to control dissent there will be an increase in violence.74 
Where the associational space is restricted the opportunities for organising are 
limited, smaller and more isolated pockets of resistance will emerge. The situation in Tunisia 
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before the uprising illustrates this phenomenon, where opposition emerged it was maintained 
within limited boundaries defined by the state. Groups that had the potential to bridge social, 
economic and geographical sectors (such as the Union of Unemployed Graduates) were 
suppressed. The ability of groups to organise and present  unified challenges to the state is 
central. Lang illustrates the significance of broad civil society organising in Eastern Europe 
in 1989, arguing:  µThe tipping point of the old regimes was not the associational practices of 
dissident groups in their niche environments as such ± the tipping point was reached when 
these associations decided to leave their niche and go public¶75. In the absence of space to 
organise, the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi provided a unifying focus and impetus 
for mobilisation, his disruptive act challenged expected behaviour and introduced uncertainty 
that the opposition was able to capitalise on. Although there had been organised and 
spontaneous opposition to the regime previously this act reached across the different societal 
cleavages to generate a feeling of solidarity. 
 The change that resulted in the case of Tunisia saw the removal of the regime and of 
restrictions on participation. It is important to note that protests that emerged in the period 
prior to the regime change were not focused on introducing democracy, but rather 
overcoming political insecurity that led to perceptions of injustice. In an early paper on the 
subject Rustow recognised the seemingly indirect nature of some cases of democratisation, 
DUJXLQJµ'HPRFUDF\ZDVQRWthe original or primary aim; it was sought as a means to some 
RWKHUHQGRULWFDPHDVDIRUWXLWRXVE\SURGXFWRIWKHVWUXJJOH¶76 This perspective is supported 
in more recent work which suggests that income inequality is a more powerful driver77 and 
that explicit support for democracy does not have a notable effect on democratic 
development.78 The corollary of this is that such a regime change is not guaranteed to lead to 
sustained democratic practices, which Inglehart argues also requires tolerance, trust, political 
activism and postmaterialist values.79  
 
Figure 4 
 
This leads back to the significance of political insecurity in facilitating regime change  
in Tunisia. Figure 4 suggests a relationship between the factors considered in this section. 
This does not capture the level of activity at each stage necessary to result in the eventual 
outcome of democratisation, but it does identify a possible path for how political insecurity 
can serve as a basis for democratisation. As the analysis proposes there is a direct connection 
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between political insecurity, civil society and protest/contentious politics. The link to 
democratisation is more tenuous and is clearly dependent on the intensity of the relationship 
between the top three factors. Events in Tunisia suggest that the presence of insecurity alone 
is not sufficient to initiate democratisation, but rather that a triggering event that is able to 
bridge between contesting groups and unite opposition may be required. 
 
Conclusion 
 The aim of this article was to identify how political insecurity contributed to the fall 
of Ben Ali. The focus on perpetuation in non-democratic regimes means that avenues for the 
population to express claims of insecurity are closed and tightly controlled. Such expressions 
of discontent would challenge the legitimacy of the regime in power, given that such 
legitimacy would be based primarily on maintaining order and stability. The non-democratic 
state is forced to rely on coercive measures to maintain order in the face of challenges to its 
authority from below. In doing so it undermines its own political security by reducing 
flexibility and adaptability necessary for the development of a resilient political system. In a 
context of poor economic performance and inequality this can lead to a build-up of pressure 
for change and explosive opposition movements. 
 In the case of Tunisia, the effects of the closed system and absence of political 
security resulted in the regime change of January 2011. While the regime was able to 
maintain the appearance of economic performance through the steady growth of GDP, the 
benefits were unevenly distributed. Economic opportunities in the South and Central regions 
were limited relative to the North, leading to discontent, as was seen in the wave of protests 
around Gafsa in 2008. The growth in the number of unemployed graduates also added to the 
feelings of resentment and provided a base of support for opposition to the regime. In 
attempting to maintain control the regime restricted the operation of established groups such 
as the UGTT and LTDH, preventing them from providing a regular outlet for claims from 
within society. The loss of legitimacy by the regime coupled with the diverse base of 
opposition meant that when it did coalesce there was little the regime could do to contain it. 
 The findings illustrate the importance of political security in maintaining the stability 
of the regime. The absence of political security means that opposition is channelled towards 
the failings of the regime in an attempt to gain redress for what is perceived to be lacking. 
The inability of the Ben Ali regime to recognise and manage the growing level of discontent, 
other than through increased restrictions, laid the ground for its removal.  
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Figure 2 ± Social Conflict Events (1991-2010) 
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